Voting Bibliography (11/22/2001)

Prepared by:

Joseph Malkevitch
Mathematics and Computing Department
York College (CUNY)
Jamaica, New York 11451-0001

Email: (for additions, suggestions, and corrections)

Amy, D., Real Choices/New Voices: The Case for Proportional Representation Elections in the United States, Columbia U. Press, New York, 1993.

Arrow, K., Social Choice and Individual Values, Wiley, New York, 1963.

Balinski, M. and R. Laraki, Majority Judgement, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2010.

Black, D., Theory of Committees and Elections, Cambridge U. Press, Cambridge, l958.

Blair, G. Cumulative voting: An effective electoral device for fair and minority representation, Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 219 (1973) 20-26.

Brams, S., Paradoxes in Politics, Free Press, New York, l976.

Brams, S., Voting Systems, in Handbook of Game Theory, Volume 2, ed. R. Aumann and S. Hart, Elsevier Science, New York, 1994.

Brams, S., and W. Lucas, P Straffin, (eds.), Political and Related Models, Springer-Verlag, New York, 1983.

Brams, S., and P. Fishburn, Approval Voting, American Political Science Review, 72 (1978) 831-47.

Brams, S., and P. Fishburn, Approval Voting, Birkhauser, Boston, 1983.

Brams, S., and J. Nagel, Approval voting in practice, Public Choice, 71 (1991) 1-17.

Cox, G., Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems, Cambridge U. Press, New York, 1997.

Di Cortona, P. and C. Manzi, A. Pennisi, F. Ricca, B. Simeone, Evaluation and Optimization of Electorial Systems, SIAM, Philadelphia, 1999.

Dodgson, C., The Principles of Parliamentary Representation, Harrison and Sons, London, 1884, (Supplement, 1885; Postscript to the Supplement, 1885).

Doron, G., and R. Kronick, Single transferable vote: An example of a perverse social choice function, America J. of Political Science, 21 (1977) 303-311.

Dowding, K. and D. King, (eds.), Preferences, Institutions, and Rational Choice, Oxford U. Press, 1995.

Dummett, M., Voting Procedures, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984.

Elster, J. and A. Hylland, (eds.), Foundations of Social Choice Theory, Cambridge U. Press, Cambridge, 1986.

Enelow, J., and M. Hinich, The Spatial Theory of Voting: An Introduction, Cambridge U. Press, Cambridge, 1984.

Farquharson, R., Theory of Voting, Yale U. Press, New Haven, l969.

Fishburn, P., The Theory of Social Choice, Princeton U. Press, Princeton, l973.

Fishburn, P., Monotonicity paradoxes in the theory of elections, Discrete Applied Math. 4 (1982) 119-134.

Fishburn, P., and S. Brams, Approval voting, Condorcet's principle, and un-off elections, Public Choice, 36 (1981) 89-114.

Fishburn, P., and S. Brams, Paradoxes of preferential voting, Mathematics Magazine, 56 (1983) 207-214.

Fishburn, P., and W. Gehrlein, An analysis of simple two-stage voting systems, Behavioral Science, 21 (1976) 1-12.

Fishburn, P., and W. Gehrlein, An analysis of voting procedures with nonranked voting, Behavoioral Science, 22 (1977) 178-85.

Friedman, J., (ed.), The Rational Choice Contraversy, Yale U. Press, New Haven, 1996.

Gibbard, A., Manipulation of voting schemes: a general result, Econometrica, 41 (1987)587-602.

Green, D., and I. Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science, Yale U. Press, New Haven, 1994.

Hart, J., Proportional representation: Critics of the British electoral system 1820-1945, Oxford U. Press, Oxford, 1992.

Hoag, C. and G. Hallett, Proportional Representation, Macmillan, New York, 1926.

Luce, R. and H. Raiffa, Games and Decisions, Wiley, New York, l957.

McLean, I., and A. Urken (eds.), Classics of Social Choice, U. Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1995.

Merrill, S., Making Multicandidate Elections More Democratic, Princeton U. Press, Princeton, 1988.

Merrill, S., Approval Voting: A "best buy" method for multicandidate elections?, Mathematics Magazine, 52 (1979) 98-102.

Moulin, H. Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making, Cambridge U. Press, New York, 1981.

Moulin, H. Social Choice, in Handbook of Game Theory, Volume 2, ed. R Aumann and S. Hart, Elsevier Science, New York, 1994.

Plott, C. and M. Levine, A model of agenda influence on committee decisions, Amer. Econ. Rev., 68 (1978) 146-160.

Quattrone, G. and A. Tversky, Contrasting rational and psychological analyses of political choice, American Political Science Review, 82 (1986) 719-36.

Riker, W., The Art of Politcal Manipulation, Yale U. Press, New Haven, 1986.

Saari, D., Geometry of Voting, Springer-Verlag, New York, 1994.

Saari, D., Basic Geometry of Voting, Springer-Verlag, New York, 1995.

Saari, D., Chaotic Elections! A Mathematician Looks at Voting, American Mathmatical Society, Providence, 2001.

Satterthwaite, M., Strategy-0proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions, J. of Economic Theory, 10 (1975) 187-217.

Sawyer, J. and D. MacRae, Game theory and cumulative voting in Illinois: 1902-1954, American Pol. Sci. Rev. 56 (1962) 936-946.

Straffin, P., Topics in the Theory of Voting, Birkhauser, Boston, l980.

Young, H., An axiomatization of Borda's rule, J. Econ. Theory, 9 (1974) 43-52.

Young, H., Social choice scoring functions, SIAM J. of Appllied Mathematics, 28 (1975) 824-38.

Young, H., Condorcet's theory of voting, America Political Science Review 82 (1988) 1231-44.

One source of additional information about voting systems can be found here.


This work was prepared with partial support from the National Science Foundation (Grant Number: DUE 9555401) to the Long Island Consortium for Interconnected Learning (administered by SUNY at Stony Brook).

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